مقاله ترجمه شده با عنوان ارتباطات درون سازمانی

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مقاله ترجمه شده با عنوان ارتباطات درون سازمانی در فرمت ورد و شامل ترجمه نوشته زیر می باشد:

Organization Improvement: Cooperative Communication 

  by :Robert Bacal

The workplace is a complicated place. Imagine a spider web of people, managers, supervisors and staff members who need to work together, interacting in various ways to fulfil the organization's mandate. Disagreements and conflict are bound to occur; between staff members, between staff and management, and between clients and members of your organization. 

As a result of working with thousands of government employees to help them acquire and use defusing hostility skills, we have concluded that a good amount of bad feelings, organizational problems, destructive conflict and inefficiency result from a lack of skill in the WAY that people communicate with each other. This isn't that surprising if we consider that our society tends to glorify the confrontational, John Wayne type heroes. And, that as children learn language, they tend to learn confrontational, negative language before they learn how to get along with others. 

Cooperative communication, or the skills needed to get along in the workplace, or, for that matter, anywhere else, are in relatively short supply, because we simply don't teach them to children or adults. So we get unnecessary conflict and friction. We get arguments that are more oriented towards winning than solving problems, and we get the so-called personality conflict, a convenient phrase that allows everyone to avoid responsibility for interpersonal problems. We get teams that don't work well because they lack the skills. We get meetings where the majority of time is wasted because people don't interact effectively. We get clashes with clients and cus tomers that occur as a result of both parties moving into confrontational ways of interacting. 

We've moved forward in defining the elements of cooperative communication so that they can be taught to people. But what is cooperative communication? 

What Is Cooperative Communication 

Some ways of communicating increase friction and anger. Other ways of communication tend to cause people to work WITH us, and not against us. While it is clear that blatant accusations, name-calling and personal attacks are confrontational (the opposite of cooperative), there are many more subtle ways to ruin a communication. To illustrate some of the techniques of cooperative communication, let's take a look at the following sentences: 

"You never finish the work on time." 

"It seems like you are having some difficulty with the timelines. What can I do to help?"  

Which of these phrases do you think is more likely to elicit a productive dialogue? Clearly the first at least "sounds" antagonistic", while the second doesn't. Another example: "If you had bothered to read the report, you would know...." 

It might be that the report wasn't clear on those points. Would you like me to explain?  

What are the cooperative rules here? In our first set of examples, the initial statement uses an absolute word "never", and as a result tends to cause the other person to argue. In addition the phrase sounds blaming. The replacement phrase lacks those confrontational characteristics, uses a qualifier "seems", and offers to work together. In the second phrase set, the key word is "bothered", which suggests that the person is lazy, or uncaring, and that is what will be heard. It also is a blaming statement. In the replacement phrase, we introduce another qualifier "might", followed by an offer to solve the problem. 

In both phrase sets, the first phrases are likely to create argument and personalized conflict while the replacement phrases are more likely to result in real problem solving. 

There are a number of other aspects of cooperative communication, far too many to outline in a single article. However, cooperative communication involves the use of techniques that are designed to prevent destructive conflict, enhance workplace morale, and save considerable time and energy. 

How Do People Learn Cooperative Communication? 

Our estimates are that between 5-10% of people consistently communicate in cooperative ways, although that estimate is certainly not scientific. A minority of people acquire these skills through experience, but unfortunately, experience is a slow, unreliable teacher. As a result we have decided to offer our Building Bridges series of seminars. At present there are two separate components to the process. The first seminar "Communicating Cooperatively In The Workplace", provides the basic components of cooperative communication, and highlights the advantages of using those components. The second seminar is entitled "Thorny Workplace Communication Problems" is a case-study based approach that allows participants to work through real communication situations, to determine how they can apply cooperative communication to them. 

The first seminar can be done stand-alone, while the second requires the first as a pre-requisite. Since we believe that seminars should be custom-designed, we will not be including an outline of content, since content will vary considerably from workplace to workplace. If your workplace problems centre around meetings, then the content would differ from a workplace that had general team-based issues. Or, if your major concern is written communication, the content would be different than if you are primarily concerned with verbal communication. What we can tell you now is that these seminars will be much different than the standard communication courses on the market, and avoid many of the tired, ineffective old saws that are often included in basic communication seminars. 

If you would like more information about cooperative communication elements you can order our help card on the subject (Communicating Cooperatively In The Workplace) by using the order form included in this newsletter. Whether you are a manager or staff member, you will find that learning and using cooperative communication techniques can reduce the amount of destructive conflict around you, save valuable time, increase team effectiveness, and reduce supervisory/ management time dealing with conflict that is a result of confrontational communication approaches.

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مقاله مدیریت ترجمه شده با عنوان استدلال مدیران

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نوشته مدیریت ترجمه شده حرف عنوان استدلال مدیران باب فرمت ورد و حاوی ترجمه متن زیر می باشد:

Secret of Success: As Christensen's Paradox testifies, finding the secret of success takes more than textbook management
Nov 2003
Robert Heller
Medieval man searched for the philosopher's stone that could turn base metal into gold. Managers and entrepreneurs often follow a similar, usually vain hope. But it needn't be vain, judged by the results of companies in one industry. They achieved $62 billion in sales in 1976-1994, twenty times the figure for rivals which hadn't found the stone.

If that isn't convincing enough, sales per firm in the lagging group only averaged a cumulative $64.5 million: the successes averaged $1.9 billion - a difference of 29 times. The statistics come from a truly remarkable management book by Clayton M. Christensen. Its explicit title, The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail, does less than justice to its message, which applies to all managements and all companies all the time - and not only to innovators.

The philosopher's stone in the statistics cited above, however, is innovation in 'disruptive technologies'. The successes 'sought growth by entering small emerging markets'. The back-markers, in contrast, pursued growth in large markets. Both groups took risks. The winners took the chance that an emerging market for the disruptive technology might not appear at all. The losers accepted the competitive risk of battling against established companies in established markets - and the first lesson is that this is fundamentally poor strategy.

MANAGEMENT PARADOX
The book's wholly convincing thesis, however, is that large companies are locked into this mode. They are forced by customer demands and competitive pressures to invest heavily to sustain their existing strengths and, if possible, to enhance that prowess. This gives rise to Christensen's Paradox. The conventional explanation when great firms stumble is that they suffer from 'incompetence, bureaucracy, arrogance, tired executive blood, poor planning, and short-term investment horizons.' The Paradox, however, states that large companies fail, absolutely or relatively, in face of disruptive technologies, not because they are poorly managed, but because their management is excellent.

So how did the failures lose leadership to the new disruptive technologies? It was because they did exactly what any business school professor would be happy to recommend:

1. Listen to your customers.
2. Invest aggressively in new technologies that will meet those customers' rising demands for performance.
3. Carefully study and meet market trends.
4. Allocate resources to investments promising the best returns.

The author, an assistant professor at Harvard Business School, gives example after example from disk drives, computers, retailing, steel-making, earth-moving equipment, etc. to show how this good management can't cope with a disruptive technology; one which introduces a different category of customers. Typically, these are attracted by lower prices and by different functionality that together help to generate new types of product. Equally typically, the disruptive innovators break all the four rules of good management cited above:

1. They don't listen to customers, because they don't have any.
2. They develop lower-performance products instead of higher.
3. They don't rely on market research, because it's useless in these circumstances.
4. They head off into tiny markets, with sales ranging from zero to insignificant.

Yet they win and win big, like the successes quoted at the start. The industry concerned is disk drives. The strategy of the 14-inch drive industry sums up Christensen's thesis. The manufacturers went to very great lengths, technically and financially, to satisfy the customers, who all made mainframe computers. The 8-inch drives introduced by newcomers like Shugart, Priam and Quantum were no use to these customers.

The disks found their market with mini-computers - then a minute segment. As the segment grew, however, and as the 8-inch disks caught up with the performance of lower-end 14-inch models, so the latter's makers began to lose out. Yet two-thirds of the 14-inchers never introduced an 8-inch model. Those that did were around two years late, and ultimately every 14-inch drive maker was driven from the industry.

To repeat, this wasn't because of any real management incompetence, but because of its opposite. The 8-inch drives offered smaller margins and a far smaller market, and the customers didn't want them. The book firmly establishes the concept of 'value networks', in which customers and supplier develop a shared interest in a given technology which suits both their purposes - including their profit objectives. The folly of ignoring the new emerging market is only clear in hindsight.

UP-MARKET PROFITS
At the time, dismissal of the down-market potential was true wisdom: that way, neither profit nor revenues lay in wait. Going up-market, however, offered both. Here again is the standard business school and industry lesson. Every manager is urged to head for the top left-hand corner of the price/performance matrix, where you win the highest price for the highest quality. That optimises the present - but may undermine, and even eliminate, the future.

To express the position another way, firms and individuals naturally play to their strengths - what they are good at, which has worked well in the past and still works well. The time comes, however, when these strengths are threatened by obsolescence - even though they are still paying off.

That was IBM's recurrent nightmare. The company may have deserved its sky-high management reputation, at least in part, but it derived its vast profits and massive market strength from serving large corporate customers. Although it eventually reacted very effectively to the rise of both the minicomputer and the PC, its natural bent was towards those same customers. But the phenomenal growth in PC sales lay outside the large corporates - and IBM's market share, once 80%, slumped to single figures.

Again, this isn't a failing peculiar to IBM. In disk drives, Seagate, the 5.25-inch leader, came late into 3.5-inch disks - and by 1991 hadn't sold a single product to what turned out to be their prime users, manufacturers of portable, laptop and notebook computers. So there is everybody's problem. The biggest opportunity and the greatest threat may well lie outside your existing business and value network. You can't, however, just abandon the latter, because that network provides your current highly satisfactory profits.

The whole organisation, and the management mind-set, are geared, quite rightly, to what is. How can the same organisation react effectively to what isn't - and may never be? Christensen's unequivocal answer is that it can't. The existing organisation will never suceed with a disruptive technology. The book cites Woolworth in the US, which attempted to combat the discount stores by opening its own Woolco outlets and simultaneously expanding the traditional variety stores.

The effort failed even more abysmally than IBM's move to absorb its phenomenally succesful PC operation into the mainstream organisation. The Woolcos disappeared completely. IBM, as noted, lost massive amounts of market share. Yet originally the PC operation was a model response to the innovator's dilemma. It's a solution that I've advocated for many years, and to which Christensen's meticulous studies give added force.

KEY PRESCRIPTIONS
The PC activity was sited well away from any other IBM centre, in Boca Raton, Florida, under independent management with a distinct mandate. It met excellently most of the book's key prescriptions:

1. Match the size of the organisation to the size of the market.
2. Learn about the market and its customers as you go along.
3. Get in early, while the market has still to be proved.
4. Accept the inevitability of mistakes.
5. Recognise the weaknesses of disruptive technologies and their strengths.

This sounds like an argument for the 'skunk works', an R&D organisation given a specific task and located in a site which makes interference unlikely. Many a skunk-works failed, however, usually because either the sponsoring management didn't have real faith in the project, or the R&D wasn't linked to manufacture and marketing. The catastrophic failure of Xerox to exploit any of the brilliant, epoch-making PC discoveries at its Palo Alto Research Center sprang from separation of the scientists from manufacturing and marketing.

There's an apparent contradiction between what happened to PARC and the argument for siting new activities well away from existing ones. But it is only apparent: the spun-off activity should be a fully integrated operation, not (like PARC) a self-contained outfit with no commercial affiliations. Without a sponsor, even brilliant research and development will be lost. Even with a sponsor, though, the independent operation may not produce the right disruptive technology or market it appropriately to the different categories of customers who become involved.

The innovators have to learn how to play from weakness. Since they can't compete with the established business for the established customers, and initally have little or no idea of where their products will sell, they have to create new strength. They have to learn how to find new customers and open up new markets - from which brilliant success can spring. That, however, doesn't makes it any easier to encompass disruptive change when those markets, in turn, become established.

What happened to the 14-inch disk drive makers was repeated again and again every time a generation of new boy entrepreneurs reduced disk sizes. The rich old boys proved incapable of resisting the competition, even though it used the identical approach that had made their own wealth (and killed their competition). The main antidote is to accept that in every business disruptive technologies or the equivalent lie in wait - developments which will one day enlarge and upset the market to your disadvantage.

One of Britain's classic entrepreneurial success stories, that of J. C. Bamford, came from disruption. In 1947 Joe Bamford produced the very first hydraulic excavator - a little machine, designed to go on the back of tractors, that was entirely unsuitable for the major construction jobs. These were dominated by cable-actuated systems.

DIDN'T NEED, COULDN'T USE
Their makers studied the hydraulic newcomers, but, to quote Christensen, 'Hydraulics was a technology that their customers didn't need - indeed couldn't use.' When hydraulic machines could finally match cable, it was too late for the cable champions to react. JCB and the other hydraulic manufacturers took most of the market. In the process, Joe and his son Sir Anthony took sales to great heights: £700 million in 1995. Their combined fortunes, created by a company that remained resolutely private, hit £800 million in 1996.

At the start, the main strength of challengers like the Bamfords lies in their highly adaptive approach. In these disruptive businesses, with their uncertain markets, there is no alternative to the points made earlier: to learn as you go along, and to make false starts and mistakes, but react swiftly until you find the better path. For perfectly sound reasons, big companies discipline this behaviour out of existence in their mainstream operations. That's why, as IBM showed, by far the best way for them to avoid the 14-inch fate is to establish and finance some imitation start-ups themselves - independent outfits that can attack small emerging markets in the style of small emerging companies.

That style involves eight principles that separate the winners from the also-rans, and the corpocrats from the entrepreneurs. The Opportunity Octet is highly valuable in any business, but in start-ups it is decisive. Winners in the start-up stakes....

1. Reward risk-taking and don't punish failure
2. Give new ideas top, top priority
3. Allow those ideas to develop freely
4. Put great performance above good order
5. Compete fiercely with themselves
6. Enlist professional managers in good time
7. Share financial rewards widely and richly
8. Go for market share first and foremost

Much of the Octet (derived from a Business Week study of Silicon Valley) has been strongly advised for all managers in Thinking Managers. Out of sheer necessity, the IT whiz-kids have been forced to abandon traditional, hierarchical ways and have learnt to live with chaos in the interests of 'super-speed and can-do culture.' That pair form the pure milk of entrepreneurism, which produces an unprecedented flow of cream in the hands of unconventional managements.

Thus, to gain its potent market position on the Internet (8) start-up Netscape famously just gave away its browsers. You simply have to forget old inhibitions. For instance, competing with yourself (2) means not being afraid to cannibalise your existing products: if you don't eat your children, someone else will. Seagate's Al Shugart, the ace entrepreneur of the disk drive, is only half-joking: 'Sometimes I think we'll see the day when you introduce a product in the morning and announce its end of life at the end of the day.'

FOUR DIFFERENCES
The Opportunity Octet are tactical necessities. But they should rest on four strategic principles which mark out winning strategies from the runners-up and flops. Winners concentrate on the winning hand; cover every bet; work with strong partners; and think really big. A wondrous example of big thinking is Finland's Nokia, whose cellular phone technology has taken it to a market value of $9 billion. Once the Finns had spotted their winning opportunity in the cellular potential, they poured in resources to achieve a quarter of world phone sales.

That meant intense concentration. For the sake of cellular, Nokia abandoned paper, tyres, metals, other electronics, cables, TV sets and its PC interests - sold to ICL. That tight focus, however, is only part of the story. It won't save you from Christensen's Paradox. That's where covering every bet comes in. The failed market leaders trapped by the Paradox actually saw that necessity - they not only developed the disruptive technologies themselves, but often took the development to the point of a business proposal. But it never made economic sense to take the technology to market - not within the established organisation. So don't try.

Independent start-ups are not the only answer. You can also take partners. The Silicon Valley giants have formed the good habit of investing in small start-ups that have promising ideas. Cisco Systems has bought or invested in 34 of them in three years: Intel has set aside $500 million for similar purposes. If the investment succeeds with a new technology, the investor is in on the ground floor; if the start-up succeeds financially, the investor cashes in; and the odds are, of course, that technological and financial breakthroughs will go hand-in-hand.

If the 14-inch drive makers had invested in the 8-inch disrupters, the leaders wouldn't have lost out - provided, of course, that they had allowed the challengers to follow their own logic. Hewlett-Packard did precisely that when setting free a new organisation to make ink-jet printers that would challenge its own immensely profitable position in laser printers. The disruptive technology then worked to H-P's overall advantage and followed the logic of Christensen's Paradox. Anything else invites eventual disruption by others - followed, if you're 14-inched, by destruction.

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تحقیق روانشناسی کودکان و اختلالات مواجهه شده در سنین مختلف

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تحقیق  روانشناسی کودکان و اختلالات تلاقی شده  در سنین جوراجور

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حسابداری صنعتی ( بهای تمام شده )به زبان ساده

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مقاله حسابداری ترجمه شده با عنوان ابزار مالی برای تثبیت جریانهای نقدی آتی

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مقاله حسابداری ترجمه شده با آغاز ابزار مالی برای اثبات جریانهای نقدی آتی در فرمت دعا و حاوی ترجمه متن زیر می باشد:

Financial instruments to fix future cash flows
By the way, even when liabilities financing the business investments are subject to a floating rather than a fixed interest rate, a similar accounting issue may eventually emerge if the floating rate is converted to a fixed rate by means of an interest rate swap or other similar contracts. Swap contracts to pay fixed interest in exchange for receiving floating interest, are sometimes called “cash flow hedges”, since they hedge the risk of fluctuation of the interest payment against expected future operating revenue. Unlike hedges against changes in the market value, there are many complicated problems about the income recognition of changes in the market price 13).
This kind of hedging transaction increases the risk of changes in the market value of the position, while averting fluctuations in cash flows. In this respect, the same transaction can be regarded either as hedging or as speculation. However, hedging is by nature a transaction intended to avert the risk of fluctuation in the return on investments. Thus, the pattern of hedging depends on whether the relevant return is measured by changes in market value or by cash flows. In this case, since gain or loss to be hedged is the cash flows of interest payments, performance of the interest rate swap contracts can be measured by the swap differentials for each year, instead of measuring changes in the market value.
A floating rate debt combined with an interest rate swap contract is, in effect, exactly the same as a fixed rate debt. Therefore, in cases where the gain or loss on a fixed rate debt is recognized on the basis of cash flows instead of changes in market value, income on the interest rate swaps to avert fluctuation in interest payments would be recognized on the cash flow basis, in line with realization of the swap differentials. Changes in the market value in anticipation of the future cash flows have nothing to do with the performance as a hedging transaction, although it would be regarded as performance if the position is considered to be speculation 14). To assert that an interest rate swap contract is intended to hedge fluctuations in cash flows is to confirm that the debts on which the interest rate is fixed by the swap are restricted to non-financial operating assets and that the interest (and principal) is paid out from cash flowing from the operating activities. In this case, changes in the market value of the debt are not regarded as realization of cash flows. Taking this into account, the gain or loss on mark-to-market measurement of the interest rate swap contract is initially included in comprehensive income and then transferred to net income when realized as a swap differential for the year
15). Anyway, the recognition of income should depend on the nature or substance of the investment, not on the external form of the asset (that is, whether it is a financial instrument or not).Financial instrument of which valuation gain or loss does not meet the condition as realized income is not only the debt bound to the business investments as described above. One of the largest issues in FASB Statement No.115, which addresses measurement of marketable securities, was a treatment of debt securities held to maturity. Even in this statement, which has adopted mark-to-mark valuation to a large extent, it has been decided that debt securities that the enterprise intends to hold to maturity without converting into cash should be measured at amortized cost, because they are not subject to risk of market value fluctuation due to changes in interest rates.
Of course, in cases of debt securities that the enterprise intends to sell at any time, the performance of the investment entirely depends on the indefinite future market price. In such cases, the current market price is the most updated information for measuring income. However, when the debt security is held to maturity, the performance of the investment is determined by the cash flows of interest payments contracted and redemption. Assuming there would be no default, the performance of the investment is fixed at the moment the debt security is purchased. In this case, income can be determined by allocating the contracted results among periods, regardless of uncertain changes in the market price. Such an allocation provides better information about the cash flows that are fixed over the future periods 16). However, even when a decision of holding to maturity has been made, the investment may be considered still exposed to risk of market value fluctuation, if the sacrificed opportunities of profiting from short-term transactions is seen as a problem. If such a view should be taken, we would have to measure the income for each period by the changes in market value. On the other hand, if we take the fact that the enterprise has averted the risk of fluctuation in market prices and fixed the performance up to maturity as a given condition, the income for each period would be independent of fluctuation in market prices. Earnings information based on the inter-period allocation of fixed cash flows is considered useful to investors in forming expectations, in that the investment policy of the management is communicated to investors 17). As discussed above, even in the case of financial instruments, the fluctuation in market prices sometimes may not be regarded as realization of cash flows. That is also true for the cases of hedges of forecasted transactions for which there is not yet any recognized position on the balance sheet.
Although the market price is indispensable information for those financial instruments, with regard to valuation gains or losses (differences between the market value at beginning and at end of the year), we need to consider an approach of recycling them from comprehensive income to net income
when realized. Again, the critical factor is not the external form of the financial instruments, but the nature of the transactions that have generated the position 18).

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